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INTRODUCTION
Reviewing A History of Private Law in Scotland in the Tulane Law Review in 
2004, Shael Herman explained how the collection (published in 2000) left him 
with an impression of the “eclectic, open-textured character of Scots legal 
evolution”, even if sometimes he had a “a sense of having toured a juridical 
Australia or Galapagos Islands inhabited by exotic flora and fauna not found 
elsewhere”.1  He noted the complexity of the relationship between Scots and 
English law, and observed:
To be sure, between Scotland and England there are striking political and 
cultural commonalities too numerous to detail.  It could hardly be 
otherwise for two island nations that share a language, a currency, and a 
border.  Yet, as the collection under review shows, the countries’ legal 
systems have diverged so considerably that Scots private law should be 
seen as an autonomous creation irrigated by its own wellsprings of 
inspiration.  Although Scots law may episodically follow English law or 
inspire it, patterns of reciprocal influence are not assured.  On a given 
issue, the two national laws may have little to exchange with one another, 
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and each legal system may decide to go its own way.  As several papers 
in the collection show, Scots lawyers march to their own drummers – or 
even to the drummers of Roman legions.  They highly prize independent 
reflection upon the course of legal development.2
This essay in honour of Shael Herman attempts to analyse the likely 
course of Scots law in an area in which it is currently being offered two 
contrasting possibilities for development: one from England, the other ultimately 
from the Civilian tradition.  The specific issue is the individual’s right to privacy, 
with particular reference to its protection against actors other than the State.  The 
English model is provided by the Common Law on breach of confidence; the 
Civilian one by the development of the actio iniuriarum in line with its 
development in other mixed jurisdictions such as South Africa and, less 
prominently, Louisiana.  Of critical importance is the stimulus to legal 
development provided by human rights jurisprudence, lately made directly 
relevant to Scots law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). 
PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SCOTS LAW TO 2000
In 1957 Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson stated of Scots law in the unreported case 
of Murray v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd: “I know of no authority to the effect 
that mere invasion of privacy however hurtful and whatever its purpose and 
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however repugnant to good taste is itself actionable.”3  Five years later T B 
Smith, Professor of Civil Law at Edinburgh University, argued that, on the 
contrary, Scots law remedied “the infliction of affront upon an individual by 
invading his privacy” by way of the actio iniuriarum received from Roman law.4
This argument for the existence of a general remedy for affront to individual 
feelings caused animo iniuriandi also gained the support of Professor David 
Walker of Glasgow University in the first edition of his book on Delict, published 
in 1966.5  Walker would later summarise the actio as follows:
An actio injuriarum is one claiming compensation for affront, dishonour or 
disgrace, naturally causing hurt feelings, though not necessarily any actual 
patrimonial loss.  The compensation due is accordingly entirely or 
predominantly solatium for the intangible loss suffered in the shape of hurt 
to feelings.6
Smith founded his approach on the idea that the Scots law of delict, unlike 
the English law of torts, is general in nature, providing a right of reparation for all 
unlawful harms or losses.  The concept of harm or loss is not confined to the 
patrimonial but extends also to the “sentimental” – damage or injury to feelings.  
While categories emerge within the over-arching generalisation – such as 
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negligence in relation to patrimonial loss, or defamation in relation to injured 
feelings – it is always possible to deal with new situations outside those 
categories, giving the law “a desirable flexibility to meet new social conditions 
and unforeseen situations”.7
The subject of privacy protection was highly topical as Smith and Walker
wrote.  1961 had seen the failure in the Westminster Parliament of an attempt to 
introduce a Right of Privacy Bill, the first in a long line of such failures.8  In 1972 a 
Committee appointed by the Scottish as well as the Home and Lord Chancellor’s 
Offices and chaired by Kenneth Younger concluded that there was weighty 
authority against a general right of privacy in Scots law, and (over-riding the 
dissents of two Scottish members of the Committee9) that the creation of such a 
general right would be conducive to undesirable uncertainty.  The Committee 
recommended instead the creation of two new specific torts (unlawful 
surveillance and disclosure or other use of information unlawfully acquired), and 
reference to the Law Commissions of England & Wales and Scotland of the law 
of breach of confidence with a view to its clarification and statement in legislative 
form, the idea being that together these three measures might better protect the 
areas of privacy giving rise to the most significant concern. In particular the law of 
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39-41.  
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earlier abortive privacy bills, and Donald Ross QC of the Scots bar. 
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confidence was seen as having the potential to become a means of protecting 
privacy generally.10  
On Scots law specifically, the Younger Report considered the potential of 
the actio iniuriarum, only to dismiss it in the light of Murray v Beaverbrook 
Newspapers.11  The views of Smith and Walker were “no doubt true in theory, but 
it is much in doubt if the Court would give a remedy except perhaps in an 
extreme case.”  There was a concession, however: “[o]n the other hand, in 
Scotland it has been said that the remedy depends upon the right rather than the 
right upon the remedy as in England, and, the Scottish Court might grant a 
remedy in an extreme case even though the remedy had never been granted 
before.”12  Perhaps these comments reflected the view of the Scots lawyer on the 
committee, Donald Ross QC (who would later rise to the Court of Session bench 
and become Lord Justice Clerk). 
In line with the Younger recommendations, the Scottish Law Commission
(where T B Smith was by now a Commissioner) subsequently procured from the 
Secretary of State for Scotland a request that, “with a view to the protection of 
privacy”, it should consider Scots law relating to breach of confidence.  The 
Chairman of the Commission, Lord Kilbrandon, had already published his 
carefully nuanced view that there was no remedy for invasion of privacy as such; 
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but “there are nevertheless in Scotland some instances of remedies given for 
wrongs which seem more dependent on infringements of privacy than on any of 
the other known grounds of action.”13  He too had drawn attention to the 
possibilities of the actio iniuriarum, commenting that “though the attack may be 
either physical (real) or verbal, the nature of the wrong is the same, namely an 
insult offered to a man whose dignity forms part of his rights in law”.14  The 
Commission produced a consultative Memorandum in 1977, and ventilated once 
more T B Smith’s argument about the potential of the actio iniuriarum as a basis 
for protecting privacy, bolstered by reference to developments in South Africa.15  
Alternatively, a statutory delict, consisting of the use or disclosure of information 
amounting to substantial and unreasonable infringement of a right of privacy, 
might be introduced; or one of disclosure or other use of unlawfully obtained 
information.16  
But by the time the Commission produced a Report on Breach of 
Confidence in December 1984, T B Smith had retired, and the proposals about 
the actio iniuriarum and the alternative statutory delicts were quietly dropped. 
Against the background of the passage in 1984 of a new Data Protection Act 
applying throughout the United Kingdom, the Commission carefully confined itself 
to the civil obligation of confidentiality, without seeking to define whatever 
                                                
13 The Hon Lord Kilbrandon, “The law of privacy in Scotland” (1971) 2 Cambrian L Rev 35-46 
(quotation at 36). 
14 Ibid, 37. 
15 Scottish Law Commission Memorandum No 40 Confidential Information (14 April 1977), 
especially at 28-35. 
16 Ibid, paras 90-98. 
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differences there might be between that and wider questions of privacy.17  No 
legislation ever followed from this report, and arguably much of the necessary 
legal development has now been effected by the courts.18  
In the early 1990s the issue of a general right to privacy resurfaced in 
public debate in Britain, creating a climate in which once again the state of Scots 
law came under review.19  The major issue at this time was media intrusion on 
private lives, especially those of celebrities, coupled with an English Court of 
Appeal affirmation of the absence of a right to privacy in English law.20  The 
broad legal consensus in both England and Scotland was that privacy was 
protected only incidentally or indirectly, not only through breach of confidence, 
but also by way of actions such as defamation, nuisance and copyright
infringement.21  But as before no legislation was brought forward by government
other than a statute (the Protection from Harassment Act 1997) to deal with a 
social problem clearly lying beyond the scope of breach of confidence, namely
personal harassment by “stalking”.22  In Scotland no major cases arose to give 
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655.  For use of the Act to protect Article 8 ECHR privacy see Howlett v Holding [2006] EWHC 41 
(QB, Eady J).
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the courts opportunity to clarify some of the many doubts and uncertainties on 
the subject of a general privacy right.  
THE IMPACT OF DOMESTICATED HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
While the discussion of the legal protection of privacy never really abated, it was 
revitalised by the passage of the HRA, which from 2 October 2000  required the 
courts to act to protect the rights enumerated under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), not only for the individual against the state, but also 
horizontally, between individuals.23  In his dissent from the conclusions of the 
Younger Report against a general right of privacy Donald Ross QC had drawn 
attention to the United Kingdom’s membership of the leading human rights 
conventions, all of which, unlike the United Kingdom jurisdictions, recognised a 
general right of privacy (in Article 8 of the ECHR, for example).  “This means,” 
said Ross, “that the United Kingdom’s acceptance of the Declaration of Human 
Rights is at least to some extent a sham.”24  Later case law in both England and 
Scotland recognised that the common law of breach of confidence should be 
developed in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights, albeit 
emphasising in this context the right of freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR) 
rather more than privacy (Article 8 ECHR).25  It was clear during the 
Parliamentary debates on the Human Rights Bill that the protection of privacy 
                                                
23 See generally H L MacQueen and J D Brodie, “Private rights, private law and the private 
domain”, in A Boyle, C Himsworth, A Loux and H MacQueen (eds), Human Rights and Scots Law 
(Oxford, 2002), 141. 
24 Younger Report (above note 10), 213. 
25 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 256 (Lord Keith of 
Kinkel), 273 (Lord Griffiths), 291 (Lord Goff of Chieveley); Lord Advocate v Scotsman 
Publications Ltd 1989 SC (HL) 122 at 166, 167, 172 (Lords Keith, Templeman and Jauncey).  
9
would be one of the first battlegrounds on which to test the effects of the 
legislation. 
No doubt encouraged by a 1998 decision of the European Commission on 
Human Rights that breach of confidence provided adequate protection of 
privacy,26 the English courts reacted to the new world created by the HRA by 
using the action to remedy infringements of privacy.27  The most prominent of the 
many cases are Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers28 and Douglas v Hello!.29  
In the former the well-known “super-model” Naomi Campbell was successful 
before the House of Lords in claiming a remedy against a newspaper in respect 
of its publication of an article and photograph exposing the falsity of her earlier 
public denials of drug addiction.  The publication revealed that in fact Campbell 
was undergoing a course of treatment with Narcotics Anonymous; the 
surreptitiously-taken photograph showed her emerging from the London 
premises of the organisation.  The Hello! case was a damages claim by two film-
stars and a celebrity magazine (OK!) against another celebrity magazine (Hello!), 
which had published surreptitiously-taken photographs of the stars’ New York
wedding celebrations.  The film-stars had previously sold exclusive rights to 
photography at their wedding to OK!.  The Court of Appeal held that the film-stars 
were entitled to damages for breach of confidence: £3,750 each for the loss of 
their personal privacy and £7,000 for the damage to their commercial interest in 
                                                
26 (1998) 25 EHHR CD 105. 
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Scotland” (2003) 78 Tulane L Rev  363, 370-376. 
28 [2004] 2 AC 457.
29 [2005] 3 WLR 881 (CA).
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the images of their wedding.  But the publishers of OK! had no claim under the 
law of confidence.  The case is subject to a further appeal to the House of Lords.
These cases entailed significant development of the law of breach of 
confidence.  Classically obligations of confidence only arose between parties 
who enjoyed some existing relationship of confidence, and only information that 
was confidential in the sense of either being deliberately kept from others, or 
known only to a deliberately confined group of people, could be protected.  Its 
most characteristic application was in the commercial and industrial sphere, with 
regard to matters such as trade secrets, know-how and so on.30  In neither of the 
cases could it be convincingly argued that there was a pre-existing relationship of 
confidence between the surreptitious photographers and their targets; while 
Campbell’s presence in a public place and the film-stars’ wedding (about which 
there had been enormous advance publicity) could hardly be treated as matter 
being deliberately kept from others.  
The basis upon which the courts in the two cases moved forward was 
however provided by the pre-HRA “Spycatcher” case,31 in which the law of 
confidence was applied to the relationship which existed between a government 
and its secret agents in an effort to prevent the publication of memoirs written by 
the latter.  Here the first difficulty was that the information to be rendered 
confidential could not really be said to have been “confided” by the government 
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to the spy; indeed, it was rather the other way round.  The House of Lords 
accordingly downplayed the importance of the confidential relationship, or at 
least the notion that such a relationship necessarily entailed a confider and a 
confidant, with only the latter being subject to the obligation.  Instead the duty of 
confidence was held to arise when confidential information came to the 
knowledge of a person in circumstances where that person had notice, or had 
agreed, that the information was confidential.  This could extend to third parties 
altogether outside the confidential relationship: in casu, newspapers who wished 
to serialise the agent’s memoirs.  So once it was accepted that personal 
information about such matters as one’s health or appearance at one’s wedding 
could be seen as confidential in the sense of being either a secret or a matter 
information about which was limited, or being kept, to a restricted group of 
people, breach of confidence could provide a remedy against invasions of 
privacy.  
This development of breach of confidence as a privacy tort has not gone 
without criticism, however.  Academic writing has pointed up fundamental 
distinctions between confidentiality and privacy: in particular that while 
confidentiality protects the secrecy of information, privacy is not necessarily 
about either information or secrets.  Confidentiality is more about the use and 
disclosure of information than its publication necessarily, while privacy interests 
extend beyond the informational, to reach at least protection from surveillance 
and intrusion (the spatial), and probably further still into wider aspects of personal 
12
dignity.32  In addition, the Spycatcher case held that confidentiality is destroyed 
by publication, even if unauthorised.  A potentially severe limitation is thus placed 
upon the ability of the action to protect privacy, in which an individual has an 
ongoing interest even after intrusion and publicity has taken place.33    
The English judiciary show awareness of this criticism and some
consequent unease.  In Douglas, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Master of the 
Rolls, observed:  “We cannot pretend that we find it satisfactory to be required to 
shoe-horn within the cause of action of breach of confidence claims for 
publication of unauthorised photographs of a private occasion.”34 In Campbell
Lord Nicholls commented:
Information about an individual’s private life would not, in ordinary usage, 
be called confidential.  The more natural description today is that such 
information is private.  The essence of the tort is better encapsulated now 
as misuse of private information.35
He also noted, however, that this would still not encompass all forms of intrusion 
upon privacy, having in mind, no doubt, another decision of the House of Lords 
issued late in 2003.  In Wainwright v Home Office,36 the facts of which occurred 
                                                
32 See e.g. Wacks, Personal Information; G T Laurie, Genetic Privacy: a Challenge to Medico-
Legal Norms (Cambridge, 2002), 211-251; G Phillipson, “Transforming breach of confidence? 
Towards a common law of privacy under the HRA” (2003) 66 Modern L Rev  726; J Morgan, 
“Privacy, confidence and horizontal effect: ‘Hello’ trouble” (2003) 62 Cambridge L J 444; N A 
Moreham, “Privacy in the common law: a doctrinal and theoretical analysis”, (2005) 121 Law 
Qrtrly Rev 628. 
33 See the problem addressed in McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB, Eady J), especially at 
paras 79-81.
34 Above, note 29, para 53.
35 Above, note 28, para 14. 
36 [2004] 2 AC 406. 
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before 2 October 2000, prison visitors who had been strip-searched in humiliating 
fashion by prison officers before admission to the prison had no claim in relation 
to their consequent distress because English law knew no general right of 
privacy.    
Lord Nicholls may also have had in mind the decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Peck v United Kingdom.37  Here, P’s privacy rights 
under Article 8 ECHR were held infringed in circumstances very difficult to bring 
even within the extended idea of breach of confidence.  A local authority 
published closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera pictures of P carrying a knife 
in a public street, while failing to disguise his identity.  The context in which this 
had occurred was P’s attempt, while suffering from clinical depression, to commit 
suicide in the street by slashing his wrists with the knife.  The authority’s 
publication of the material had been intended to show how the use of CCTV 
could deal with dangerous situations; the police had been prompted to arrest P 
(and so save his life) after sighting the images.  The Court observed further that 
“a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, .. may fall 
within the scope of ‘private life’”; this could include “activities of a professional or 
business nature”.38
Shortly after the decision in Campbell, the European Court extended its 
concept of privacy as a human right still further, by holding in Von Hannover v 
                                                
37 (2003) 36 EHRR 41.
38 Ibid, at 57. 
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Germany 39 that the Article 8 ECHR rights of Princess Caroline of Monaco were 
infringed by the publication of unauthorised photographs of her engaged in 
private activities, even when the accompanying coverage was favourable or 
anodyne.  She did not have to retire to a secluded place to enjoy this right of
privacy; the Court in this context again deployed the concept of the protected 
zone of interaction with others within a public context.  The Princess was not a 
public figure involved in any political or public debate of general interest to 
society, and “in these conditions freedom of expression calls for a narrower 
interpretation”.40  The Court’s conceptualisation of private life extended to 
aspects of personal identity, such as a person’s name or picture, and to physical 
and psychological integrity.41
In a significant further paragraph, the Court also elaborated the horizontal 
effect to be given to Article 8 ECHR:
The Court reiterates that although the object of Article 8 is essentially that 
of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public 
authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such 
interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may 
be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family 
life.  These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to 
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations between 
individuals themselves. … The boundary between the State’s positive and 
                                                
39 (2005) 40 EHRR 1.
40 Ibid, para 66. 
41 Ibid, para 50.
15
negative obligations under this provision does not lend itself to precise 
definition.  The applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar.  In both 
contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck 
between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as 
a whole; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of 
appreciation.42
The Court also cited in full Resolution 1165 of the Council of Europe, 
published in 1998 in the aftermath of the death of Princess Diana in a Paris car 
crash in August 1997, widely attributed at the time to the pursuit of the Princess’
vehicle by paparazzi press photographers.43  The main message of the 
Resolution was that a balance fell to be struck between freedom of expression 
and privacy, and that the ECHR did not privilege either over the other.  
Paragraph 12 of the Resolution emphasised the horizontal as well as vertical 
effect of Article 8 ECHR, while paragraph 14 was a call to ECHR member States 
“to pass legislation, if no such legislation yet exists, guaranteeing the right to 
privacy [and] containing the following guidelines”.  First amongst the guidelines is 
the following: “the possibility of taking an action under civil law should be 
guaranteed, to enable a victim to claim possible damages for invasion of 
privacy”.
All this raises difficult questions for English and Scots law.  While the 
horizontal effects of the HRA in the courts are not disputed, their exact nature is.  
                                                
42 Ibid, para 57 (emphasis supplied).
43 Available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA98/eres1165.htm. 
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In general the English courts have held that Convention rights do not become 
directly enforceable in their own right as a result of the 1998 Act; rather the 
existing law has to be developed in a way that takes the rights into account as 
key underlying values.  So the judicial creation of a new tort of invading privacy 
seems impossible; the protection of privacy outside the realm of personal 
information will have to find a vehicle within other existing torts, just as 
informational privacy has taken over the breach of confidence wagon.44  The 
Council of Europe Resolution has often been referred to in this process, for 
example in the finding in Campbell that in balancing freedom of expression and 
privacy neither right had any pre-eminence over the other;45 but the courts do not 
see themselves in a position to make the kind of wholesale change that 
paragraph 14 envisages.  Giving the leading speech in the Wainwright case, for 
example, Lord Hoffmann argued that privacy was too protean a concept to lend 
itself to other than specific and detailed types of protection, together with 
appropriate defences, such as could only be achieved by legislation.46  But on 
the other hand relief cannot be realistically expected from the legislature, which 
has a long history of failure to guarantee that invasion of privacy is civilly 
                                                
44 Note that a pre-HRA attempt to extend the common law of private nuisance to deal with 
“stalking” (Khorosandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727) was later over-ruled by the House of Lords 
(Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655). Contrast Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34, where a 
New Zealand court felt able to move towards a tort of invasion of privacy within the Common Law 
tradition. 
45 Campbell v MGN Ltd, paras 113 (Lord Hope of Craighead), 138 (Baroness Hale of Richmond) 
(despite Human Rights Act 1998 s 12(4)).  See also A v B & C [2003] QB 195; Douglas v Hello!
[2003] 3 All ER 996 (Lindsay J). For a Scottish case in which the Convention right of freedom of 
expression prevailed against the private interests of a law firm, see Dickson Minto WS v Bonnier 
Media 2002 SLT 776; compare Howlett v Holding [2006] EWHC 41 (QB, Eady J), where the right 
of privacy prevailed over freedom of expression.  The Scottish courts have been more reluctant to 
allow privacy an over-riding quality in criminal cases: see e.g. Henderson and Marnoch v HM 
Advocate 2005 JC 301.
46 Wainwright (above note 36), para 33.
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actionable as such, and is unlikely to want the inevitable confrontation with a 
highly hostile media which such attempts to legislate have always invited in the 
past.47  In Scotland too the Scottish Parliament is likely to be similarly shy of 
tackling the issue, and the development of the law will most probably be left to 
the courts.
SCOTS LAW: MAKING CHOICES
Shortly after the passage of the HRA, the Court of Session judge Lord Reed 
commented in a case involving personal harassment that privacy “is an area 
where the development of the common law should have regard to the European 
Convention on Human Rights”.48  What then are the choices open to the courts in 
Scotland with regard to the protection of privacy at common law?  Are they as 
confined as the English courts seem to be?  Will they have to work with privacy 
as an important value underpinning the development of specific common law 
actions under headings such as breach of confidence, defamation and nuisance, 
as well as the interpretation of statutes like the Data Protection and the 
Protection from Harassment Acts?  Or is there a basis already within the 
common law for a wider, more general approach to a right of action for invasion 
of privacy such as the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human 
Rights seem to want to see? 
                                                
47 See in support of this conclusion the Government’s negative response (Cm 5985: Oct 2003) to 
the Fifth Report of the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee on 
Privacy and Media Intrusion (HC 458-1, June 2003) and its recommendation of the introduction of 
a new privacy law against media intrusion. 
48 Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd 1999 SC 255, 262. 
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Breach of confidence
Of the various common law possibilities for protecting privacy, breach of 
confidence has enjoyed the greatest prominence in Scotland as in England since 
2000.  Breach of confidence seems to have emerged as a category within the 
Scots law of delict (in so far as it was not an obligation created by contract) in the
course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.49  The few cases made it 
difficult to state the law with any great certainty when the Scottish Law 
Commission first examined it in the 1970s.  But it did seem to depend upon the 
existence of a relationship between the parties which was either contractual or 
very close to being so.50  In 1984 the Commission recommended that the 
obligation of confidence should arise where a recipient (1) agreed or undertook to 
treat the information as confidential; (2) acquired it by illegal or improper means; 
or (3) should as a reasonable person have realised in all the circumstances that 
the information should be treated as confidential.51  Only with regard to the third 
category did it matter that the information so acquired was actually confidential.   
So the second category appeared to give what was really protection against 
intrusion (and thus of  privacy) by way of an artificial form of confidentiality, while 
the first perhaps overlooked the possibility of public policy limitations upon the 
freedom to contract to prevent freedom of expression.
                                                
49 The earliest identified case is Kerr v Duke of Roxburgh (1822) 3 Murr 126. See also AB v CD
(1851) 14 D 177.  
50 See Scot Law Com Memo No 40, paras 7-43. 
51 Scot Law Com No 90 (1984). 
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Five years later, however, the possibility of legislation was effectively pre-
empted by the case of Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd,52 where in a 
Scottish appeal the House of Lords followed its own earlier decision in the 
English Spycatcher case.  This established beyond question the existence of 
obligations of confidence outside contract in Scots law, and also that persons 
coming into the possession of information knowing it to be confidential could 
come under the obligation.   In both the House of Lords and the Second Division 
of the Court of Session below, the judges affirmed, in the words of Lord Justice-
Clerk Ross, that “there is ample justification for the conclusion that in this respect 
the laws of England and Scotland are to the same effect”.53  It was thus possible 
in 1993 to construct an analysis of the Scots law of breach of confidence for the 
Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia which, although built around the law reform 
proposals of the Scottish Law Commission published in 1984, drew quite freely 
on English authorities and writings in so far as they seemed to manifest general 
principles of use to Scots lawyers.54  
The essence of that analysis was as follows.  Obligations of confidence 
arise when the reasonable recipient knows or should realise from the 
circumstances that information is confidential.  A key element in this is the 
relative inaccessibility of the information.  Confidentiality is destroyed when the 
information is published: although the publisher may be liable for that act, further 
circulation cannot be prevented.  The obligation is not to use or disclose the
                                                
52 1989 SC (HL) 122.
53 Ibid at 143, approved by Lord Keith at 164. 
54 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 18, paras 1451-1492.
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information.  Defences include disclosure in the public interest, and remedies 
available included interdict, damages for patrimonial loss and claims for the 
infringer’s gains.  But hesitation was expressed about extending breach of 
confidence into the domain of privacy and personal information: 
particular difficulty may be posed by defining what personal information a 
reasonable person ought to recognise as confidential when the 
information has become public knowledge … [I]t is clear that 
confidentiality is not a complete substitute for privacy, and that there may 
be various problems which the law of confidence cannot reach.55
None the less, provided that the concept of confidential information extended 
beyond the commercial and the governmental into the personal realm, the model 
could be applied to protect privacy: 
A good example of the inaccessibility of the information being enough to 
impose the obligation of confidence would be the personal secret about, 
for example, marriage, sexual orientation or health.  If information about 
such aspects of a person’s life is not generally known and is discovered by
means other than open disclosure by the person himself, the reasonable 
man would regard it as confidential.56
The way is therefore open for the Scottish courts to use breach of 
confidence to protect privacy should an appropriate case arise – and indeed 
arguably some have already done so.57  But these judicial decisions may 
however show some of the limitations of breach of confidence as a means of 
                                                
55 Ibid, vol 18, para 1456.
56 Ibid, vol 18, para 1465. 
57 See further below, text accompanying notes 59-63. 
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protecting privacy.  The liability of the person who knows or ought to realise that 
information coming to hand is private, or confidential in the language of the 
action, is a key element of privacy protection.  But there is genuine doubt 
whether Scots law goes quite so far as was proposed in the Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia with regard to third parties who come into possession of the 
confidential information by a route other than provision by the person claiming 
confidentiality.  Probably the leading case, inasmuch as it was decided by an 
Extra Division of the Court of Session, is Osborne v BBC.58  In essence this was 
a case about whether a confidentiality agreement between a local authority and 
one of its employees bound a third party (the BBC) which, having come into 
possession of the confidential information, proposed to broadcast it.  For the 
employee to get an interdict against the third party, the court ruled, she would 
have to show that the information had been transmitted to the third party by the 
person subject to the obligation of confidence under the agreement.   
Cases involving this third party issue in contexts clearly raising privacy 
rather than mere confidentiality concerns, have so far arisen only in the Outer 
House.  In Quilty v Windsor59 a prisoner lodged in court and with officials the 
medical records of a prison officer against whom he was making a complaint.  
The prison officer claimed that his medical records were confidential, and must 
have been obtained from his ex-wife (to whom the prisoner was now married), 
since she had recovered the records during her divorce action against him.  
                                                
58 2000 SC 29. The case is procedurally tangled but did involve elements of privacy (the 
petitioner’s sexuality) as well as confidentiality. 
59 1999 SLT 346. 
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There was argument about the extent to which Scots law recognised a duty of 
confidence in a third party coming into possession of confidential information.  
Lord Kingarth dismissed the action on the basis of insufficient specification of the 
nature and content of the medical records, but also remarked that, while a third 
party coming into possession of confidential information could be subject to a 
duty of confidence, it was not clear law that this would arise unless the third party 
knew that the material was confidential.  Further, the averments by the prison 
officer in this case did not show clearly that the circumstances were such that the 
prisoner knew the materials had been transmitted to him in breach of confidence.
A contrasting approach is apparent, however, in Hardey v Russel & 
Aitken.60  Hardey sued the solicitors of a party with whom he had been litigating 
in an earlier series of actions.  During process in the earlier actions, Hardey’s 
medical records had been accidentally bundled up with those of the other party 
by their mutual general practitioner while responding to a process of specification 
of documents for use in the case.  They had then been received by the solicitors, 
copied, and shown to counsel who used them in the later course of the case.  
While the principal documents were returned to Hardey, the solicitors retained 
copies.  Lord Johnston held that Hardey’s claim against the solicitors was 
relevant and should go to proof.  He said: 
I am not prepared to rule at this stage that confidentiality cannot remain 
attached to the documents, which in turn may depend on how they are 
used. … As a matter of the general law, it is clear to me that both England 
                                                
60 9 January 2003, Lord Johnston. 
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and Scotland have recognised the principle that a third party obtaining 
information which is confidential to another person and who thereafter 
uses it, may breach a duty owed by him to the original confider so not to 
do.61  
Both Quilty and Hardey concern individual medical records, clearly 
pertaining to the private sphere of the individuals concerned; but the uncertainty 
of the law of confidence with relation to third party havers meant that protection 
of their privacy was far from assured in either case.  Of course, as Lord Kingarth 
recognises in Quilty, the law is developing; and now it will have to develop, in 
appropriate cases, having regard to the Article 8 ECHR right to privacy.  But the 
present lack of clarity on the matter is unfortunate.
Another issue is presented by X v BBC.62  The pursuer, a private 
individual, succeeded in obtaining an interim interdict on the basis of breach of 
confidence, to prevent the BBC broadcasting a TV documentary showing her 
intoxicated and behaving in unusual ways in a public place.  Temporary Judge 
Malcolm Thomson QC followed Peck and Campbell in reaching his decision.  
The individual initially consented in writing to being filmed for the documentary, 
but then withdrew her consent.  What seems especially significant is that the 
information (surely private rather than confidential) was (1) behaviour in a public 
place and (2) material contained in a social inquiry report read out in open court, 
i.e. in some sense published.  Temporary Judge Thomson’s difficulty in the law of 
                                                
61 Paras 10, 11. 
62 2005 SCLR 740. 
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confidence arose from the Spycatcher rule that, once published, information is no 
longer confidential and its further publication cannot be stopped, albeit there may 
be remedies such as damages or account of profits for the wrong of the initial 
disclosure.  In the end Judge Thomson overcame his difficulty by reference to the 
rules of interim interdict: the petitioner had raised questions to try on which she 
had real prospects of success, and the balance of convenience was in her 
favour, with a real risk of serious harm to her if the broadcast went ahead as 
planned.63
The actio iniuriarum
The other element of the common law brought into play in the courts to protect 
privacy since the passage of the HRA is the actio iniuriarum as proposed by T B 
Smith forty years before.  The judicial reaction to date has been at best tentative, 
probably reflecting the nature of the arguments being put to them by counsel not 
wholly familiar with the concepts involved.  
The actio iniuriarum has a somewhat uncertain history in Scotland, despite 
Smith’s bold claims for it.64  John Blackie has shown that the concept of iniuria as 
the wrong of affront to a person’s honour and reputation was indeed received 
                                                
63 In the end the documentary in question was broadcast on BBC Scotland on 31 January 2006, 
following a settlement between X and the BBC just before a three-week court proof was due to 
commence.  Under the settlement X appeared in the programme but was identified only by her 
first name.  No money changed hands under the settlement.  I am grateful to Alistair Bonnington 
and Rosalind McInnes of the BBC for this information. 
64 For what follows, see J Blackie, “Defamation”, in Reid and Zimmermann (above note 1), 633-
707. 
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and well understood in Scotland by 1500,65 with the main source of reception 
being the medieval canon law.  But only in the eighteenth century were cases of 
iniuria brought within the jurisdiction of the Court of Session, and so there is no 
significant treatment in the writings of Stair, apart from a reference to fame, 
reputation and honour as one of the “several rights and enjoyments” by which 
“damages and delinquences may be esteemed”.66  The first substantial analysis 
came from the pen of Bankton in the mid-eighteenth century, drawing heavily on 
Voet, but his emphasis fell on iniuria by representations, or defamation;67 and so, 
Blackie suggests, a wider concept of the actio iniuriarum as a protection against 
forms of affront other than defamatory statements failed to take deep root.  
Suitable cases for such development of the law none the less occurred in the 
nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, involving, for example, the injuries to 
feelings resulting from wrongful disruption to one’s brother’s funeral,68 the 
unauthorized post-mortem removal of organs from the body of a deceased 
relative,69 the unauthorized display in the window of a photographer’s shop of 
wedding photographs commissioned from him,70 and the unwarranted inclusion 
of one’s photograph and fingerprints in a “rogues’ gallery” collection of such 
material held by the police;71 but while the injured party in these cases was often 
                                                
65 Note further here the reference to “accione iniuriarum” in legislation of 1318, discussed in H L 
MacQueen, “Some thoughts on wrang and unlaw”, in idem (ed), Miscellany V, Stair Society vol 
52, Edinburgh, 2006),13, and to “ilk small iniure” in another statute of 1496 (Acts of the 
Parliament of Scotland, edd T Thomson and C Innes (Edinburgh, 1844-1875), vol 2, 238 (ch 3)). 
66 Institutions, I, 9, 4. 
67 Bankton, I, 10, 21-39. 
68 Crawford v Mill (1830) 5 Murr 215.
69 Pollok v Workman (1900) 2 F 354; Conway v Dalziel (1901) 3 F 918; Hughes v Robertson 1913 
SC 394. 
70 McCosh v Crow & Co (1903) 5 F 670. 
71 Adamson v Martin 1916 SC 319.
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successful in making claims for damages compensating injury to feelings 
(solatium), the judges typically offered little by way of juristic analysis  of their 
results, and received no assistance from authors.  Indeed, the term actio 
iniuriarum was frequently misapplied to actions of reparation for personal injuries 
generally.72  Bell’s statement, that “in Scotland the Court of Session is held to 
have jurisdiction by interdict to protect not property merely, but reputation and 
even private feelings, from outrage and invasion”, gave only the unauthorized 
publication of personal correspondence as an example,73 and was deployed only 
in that specific context in subsequent case law.74  
In 1931, however, Hector McKechnie affirmed the continued existence of 
a general delict of “assault” based upon insult or affront rather than physical 
attack.75  The two most significant mid-twentieth-century cases were Robertson v 
Keith76 and Murray v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd.77  In the former, the pursuer 
raised what was initially a defamation action against the local chief constable of 
police in respect of his force’s continuous and obvious surveillance of her house.  
Although she changed her ground of action to be simply the affront this caused 
her, she was unsuccessful because she could not establish that the chief 
                                                
72 This usage was still not wholly eliminated by the end of the twentieth century, despite Lord 
Kilbrandon in McKendrick v Sinclair 1972 SC (HL) 25 at 67; see further T B Smith, “Designation 
of delictual actions: damn injuria damn” 1972 SLT (News) 125, and idem, “Damn injuria again”, 
1984 SLT (News) 85. 
73 Bell, Commentaries, I, 3, 111 (7th edn). 
74 White v Dickson (1881) 8 R 896. See also Cadell and Davies v Stewart (1804) Mor ‘Literary 
Property’, Appendix no 4 (the love letters of the poet Robert Burns to ‘Clarinda’, published after 
his death by her consent; case mainly concerned with common law copyright). 
75 H McKechnie, “Reparation”, in Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland vol 12 (1931) paras 
1124-1130. 
76 1936 SC 29.
77 Above, note 3. 
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constable had acted either unlawfully, or maliciously and without probable cause.  
In Murray a newspaper published a letter from a local judge in which he 
advocated heavier penalties for certain motoring offences.  A journalist for 
another newspaper discovered that about a year before the publication the judge 
had himself been convicted of a road traffic offence.  Having interviewed the 
judge and been asked not to publish the story, the journalist went ahead and did 
so, lacing his story with ironical comment on the situation.  The judge’s 
defamation action was unsuccessful and, as already noted, the court also denied 
the existence of a general right to privacy.  But Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson left 
open the possibility that invading privacy might be an ingredient in showing 
malice where it was necessary to a cause of action, and added: “No doubt there 
are cases where the digging up of old skeletons will be frowned on by the law, 
but it must be a question of circumstances.”78
If neither Robertson nor Murray amounts to more than at best obiter 
support for the survival of the actio iniuriarum, perhaps more weight can be 
attached to Henderson v Chief Constable of Fife.79  Mrs Henderson was in police 
custody, subject to a lawful detention; but the police, following a normal practice 
for which there was no statutory authority, required her to remove her brassiere 
while she remained in a police cell.  This was to prevent her using the garment to 
harm herself, even although there was no indication of any danger of this being 
at all likely in the particular situation.  Lord Jauncey held that the police action 
                                                
78 Found quoted in Smith, Short Commentary, 655. 
79 1988 SLT 361.
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was a clear invasion, without justification, of Mrs Henderson’s liberty, from which 
it followed that she had a remedy in damages.  He continued, in a statement 
clearly contrasting with the approach of the House of Lords in the otherwise very 
similar case of Wainwright:
I should perhaps add that the researches of counsel had disclosed no 
Scottish case in which it had been held that removal of clothing forcibly or 
by requirement could constitute a wrong but since such removal must 
amount to an infringement of liberty I see no reason why the law should 
not protect the individual from this infringement. … I consider that an 
award of £300 would fairly reflect the invasion of privacy and liberty which 
Mrs Henderson suffered as a result of having to remove her brassiere.80
Since the passage of the HRA, there have been at least three cases
referring directly or indirectly to the actio iniuriarum.81  Ward v Scotrail 82 was an 
attempt to recover damages in respect of alleged sexual harassment of a female 
by a male colleague at work.  A proof was allowed although the pursuer’s 
pleadings were unclear on whether the case rested on negligence or some other 
legal basis.  Lord Reed noted that in a negligence action emotional distress was 
insufficient for recovery in delict; there had to be physical injury, which none the 
less included “recognizable psychiatric illness”.83  But he did not dissent from the 
pursuer’s argument that “damages are recoverable for conduct which deliberately 
                                                
80 Ibid, 367. 
81 There may be a fourth, currently at avizandum: Stevens v Greater Glasgow Health Board (on 
retention of children’s organs at post mortem). 
82 1999 SC 255. The case is the Scottish equivalent of the English case of Khorosandjian v Bush
[1993] QB 727 (above, note 22), to which much reference is made in Lord Reed’s opinion. 
83 1999 SC 255, 261. 
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causes fear and alarm, even in the absence of personal injury: damages are 
recoverable in respect of the affront”.84
In Martin v McGuiness,85 the issue was the admissibility of evidence 
procured by private investigators through intrusions upon an individual’s privacy 
contrary to Article 8 ECHR by way of unasked-for visits to his home and 
surveillance of his house from a neighbouring property.  Lord Bonomy 
recognised that the investigators’ conduct might infringe Article 8 ECHR, but that 
its objective, to test whether the individual’s claims of a back injury suffered as 
the result of a road accident, in respect of which he was seeking reparation from 
the investigator’s employers, were exaggerated, was justified by considerations 
of, not only the employer’s protection of his own interests, but also his right to a 
fair trial (Article 6 ECHR).  Counsel for the pursuer, arguing that the court had a 
duty to develop the existing law to be compatible with the ECHR and referring to 
Robertson v Keith, submitted that the actio injuriarum provided a basis for the 
protection of the pursuer’s privacy in this case.  Lord Bonomy noted that 
counsel’s “rather cautious submission” was not elaborated or supported by any 
reference to authority,86 whereas counsel for the defender, citing the Digest87 and 
Reinhard Zimmermann’s book on obligations,88 argued that “the actio iniuriarum
provides redress only where deliberate conduct involves an attack on personality 
                                                
84 Ibid, 260.
85 2003 SLT 1424, 2003 SCLR 548. 
86 Para 27. 
87 The reference given in Lord Bonomy’s opinion is to “the Mommsen edition, at paras 21.7 and 
21.18”.  What this means is obscure to the present writer, but presumably the passages in 
question are to be located within D 47.10, the principal treatment of the actio iniuriarum in the 
Digest (possibly D 47.10.7 and 18-19).
88 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations (above note 3), ch 31. 
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for an unlawful purpose”.89  While Lord Bonomy confined himself merely to 
recording these arguments, he did respond to the defence submission with the 
comment that “[i]t may, however, be only a short step from an assault on 
personality of the nature of an insult to the dignity, honour or reputation of a 
person, causing hurt to his feelings, to deliberate conduct involving unwarranted 
intrusion into the personal or family life of which the natural consequence is 
distress”.90  He also noted of a defence argument, that Scots law has never 
recognized a specific right to privacy, that “[o]f course it does not follow that, 
because a specific right to privacy has not so far been recognized, such a right 
does not fall within existing principles of the law”.91
The facts of the third case, Hardey v Russel & Aitken, have already been 
referred to in the discussion of breach of confidence.92  The pursuer submitted
that his action was based, not upon, breach of confidence, but “on the actio 
injuriarum claiming damages for a delictual wrong committed by the defenders to 
him in respect of the records”, thus getting round the possible limitation of the 
breach of confidence claim in respect of third party acquirers of confidential 
information.  Lord Johnston simply did not address this point since, as already 
noted, he was content that the law of confidence was applicable in the case. 
                                                
89 Para 29. 
90 Para 29. 
91 Para 28. 
92 Above, text accompanying note 60.
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The significance of all the decisions since Henderson in 1988 is that in 
none of them has the argument about the actio iniuriarum been rejected outright, 
and that the actual decisions in the cases are broadly consistent with an 
extension of the principles of the action beyond the realm of the purely verbal 
injury.  The question is how far it can be taken:  is it, as Professor Whitty would 
argue, that “the development of private law rights of personality through the actio 
iniuriarum can be at the same time the vehicle for giving horizontal effect to the 
constitutional right of privacy conferred by ECHR, Article 8”?93  Or is it rather the 
case, as Professor Norrie would have it, that the cases are merely illustrations of
the existence in Scots law of a number of disparate wrongs each partly 
explicable by the need to protect individuals from affront, but not actually flowing 
from a general principle to that effect?94
If it is accepted that breach of confidence does not, and cannot, provide all 
the answers to privacy questions, the great attraction of a generalized actio 
iniuriarum is that it can tackle intrusions other than the publication of private 
information, such as Wainwright-style physical intrusion, and it allows proper 
consideration of the kind of issues which so troubled the court in X v BBC, i.e. 
that in a privacy rather than a confidentiality matter, the public nature of the 
information concerned was of very limited relevance.     
                                                
93 N R Whitty, “Rights of personality, property rights and the human body in Scots law”, (2005) 9 
Edinburgh L Rev 194 at 207. 
94 J Burchell and K Norrie, “Impairment of reputation, dignity and privacy”, in R Zimmermann, D 
Visser and K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and 
Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (Oxford, 2004), 570.
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But otherwise the cases on the actio iniuriarum in Scotland, whether 
before or since the HRA, cannot yet be said to form a very solid platform of 
principle for further development of the law.  However, the banner has been 
picked up in academic writing which may yet reinforce the assurance with which 
practitioners and courts approach the subject.  This writing has especially 
emphasized the value of comparative law, and in particular of comparison with 
South Africa, where the actio iniuriarum had become the basis for a strong law of 
personality rights, founded on the concept of an individual’s right to dignity which 
included privacy even before that was reinforced by the enshrinement of dignity 
and privacy as constitutional rights in 1996.  The model is thus very similar in 
some ways to the structure within which Scots law must now operate.95  Lessons 
may be learned from the experience of other mixed legal systems, not least 
Louisiana, which has also recognized privacy amongst rights of personality 
derived from its general codal provisions on delict.96  In addition, the extensive 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights must be taken into 
account,97 and through that the experience of other European jurisdictions also 
subject, in their different ways, to the ECHR.98  A last possibility is to take 
                                                
95 Ibid, 568-575; Whitty (above note 93), 199, 201, 206.  
96 See F F Stone, Tort Doctrine (Louisiana Civil Law Treatise vol 12, 1977), ch 9; P N Broyles, 
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advantage of European private law projects,99 amongst which the Study Group 
on a European Civil Code has identified as a wrongful act giving rise to civil 
liability infringement of a natural person’s right to respect for his or her personal 
dignity, such as the rights to liberty and privacy.100  It must be acknowledged, 
however, that the Scottish courts have not hitherto demonstrated any great 
eagerness to engage in comparative law exercises to develop the common law 
of Scotland,101 or indeed much enthusiasm for the adoption of expansive general 
principles opening up considerable new tracts of potential liability.102
ANALYSIS AND QUESTIONS
Comparative study suggests that if Scots lawyers are to respond to the pressure 
from the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights by way of a 
generalized actio iniuriarum, a number of issues must be addressed, many 
inchoate in the present state of the authorities but others never yet touched upon.  
Professors Burchell and Norrie have pointed out the need to determine the basis 
of liability: “whether animus or culpa, intent or negligence”.103  Upon whom will 
the onus lie in this regard: upon the pursuer to establish that the defender’s 
                                                
99 See e.g. C von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts vol 1 (Oxford, 1998), 272-274, 585-
588; W van Gerven, J Lever and P Larouche, Cases, Materials and Text on Tort Law (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2000), 141-168.  
100 See the Study Group’s website, http://sgecc.net, Article 2:203 of the Tort Law text.  
101 H L MacQueen, “Mixing it? Comparative law in the Scottish courts” (2003) 11 European 
Review of Private Law 735.  
102 H L MacQueen, “Judicial reform of private law”, (1998) 3 Scottish Law & Practice Qrtrly 134. 
103 Burchell and Norrie (above note 94), 574. See also thoughtful comments by K Norrie, “The 
intentional delicts”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland vol 2 
(Oxford, 2000), at 478-480. 
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conduct had the necessary character, or upon the defender to establish that it did 
not?  Or will be there some invasions of privacy where liability will be strict?104  
Again, what forms of affront will be recognized as worthy of protection?  In 
Campbell, the House of Lords recognized that “the law of privacy is not intended 
for the protection of the unduly sensitive”,105 but rejected the idea that to be 
actionable an invasion of privacy had to be highly offensive;106 it was enough that 
it occurred where there was a reasonable expectation of privacy.  The majority in 
Campbell was also against the minority view that, since the photographs in the 
case were not in themselves depictions of the subject in an embarrassing or 
undignified state, no wrong had been committed; what mattered was that the 
newspaper must have acquired its information through betrayal by a fellow-
patient of Narcotics Anonymous or a member of Campbell’s entourage.  The 
case (and also X v BBC) are also consistent with the European Court’s emphasis 
in Peck and Von Hannover that a private zone may still exist even in public 
space.107
The foundation of the law on the affront of the victim, or their reasonable 
expectations of privacy, also creates some difficulties beyond mere scope.  A 
question of growing significance is whether current legal concepts can extend to 
                                                
104 Neethling (above note 98) 218-220.
105 Lord Hope of Craighead at para 94. 
106 The test proposed by Gleeson CJ in the Australian case of Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 1 (HCA). 
107 See above, text accompanying notes 38-40.  Note also the South African Constitutional Court 
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the “right not to know”, especially significant with regard to genetic information 
about individuals which they would choose not to discover or seek out, but may 
be required to disclose, for example as a condition of obtaining employment, 
insurance or medical treatment.108  Then again, what if any protection is to be 
offered to the juristic as opposed to the natural person?  And what about natural 
persons who are perhaps incapable of feeling affront or having reasonable 
expectations of privacy, such as very young children, the comatose (or nearly 
so), the hopelessly drug addicted, or the senile and demented?  The wider, more 
objective concept of dignity may perhaps have a role to play here.109  
Another fundamental question can be drawn from Neethling’s comparative 
observation:
There is general consensus that personality rights are private law 
(subjective) rights which are by nature non-patrimonial and highly personal 
in the sense that they cannot exist independently of a person since they 
are inseparably bound up with his personality.  From the highly personal 
and non-patrimonial nature of personality rights it is possible to deduce 
their juridical characteristics: they are non-transferable; unhereditable; 
incapable of being relinquished or attached; they cannot prescribe; and 
they come into existence with the birth and terminated by the death of a 
human being.  As such, personality rights form a separate category of 
rights, distinguishable from real, personal and immaterial property rights 
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which are patrimonial rights that can exist independently of the 
personality.110
This is certainly the kind of overall conceptualization of which judicial decision-
making is incapable, at least working alone from the near blank slate that is the
modern Scots actio iniuriarum.111  On the other hand, the questions involved may 
not arise so sharply if a right of privacy can also become a right of publicity; that 
is, if it is accepted, as it is in much of the United States and increasingly 
elsewhere in the world, that privacy is a commodity that can be sold – as it was, 
for example, in Douglas v Hello!.112  Indeed, many examples (of whom only 
Marilyn Monroe, Elvis Presley and Princess Diana need be named to give the 
general idea) show that the commercial value of a personality can long outlive 
the person.113  For Scots law, the most immediate issue may lie in remedies.  
The case law shows an emphasis on interdict and damages, with the latter 
measured typically as solatium for injured feelings.114  But there is as yet no 
clearly stated limitation of damages to that head; nor has the possibility been 
excluded of a financial remedy linked to the profits made by the invader of 
privacy.115  
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and allowed a proof before answer. 
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A final question concerns the defences or justifications to be available to 
the alleged invader of privacy.  The Scottish cases give some pointers: for 
example, lawful authority and absence of malice in Robertson v Keith, consent in 
X v BBC, the human right to a fair trial in Martin v McGuiness.  In Murray v 
Beaverbrook Newspapers, as T B Smith noted, “the learned sheriff, having 
deliberately entered the arena of controversy and having attracted publicity to 
himself, could scarcely justify his demand for immunity from comment, even if of 
dubious taste”.116  It may be that some of the defences already found in the law 
of confidence and of defamation could be translated into the context of privacy 
without undue difficulty.  Perhaps the most significant – certainly from the point of 
view of the media - would be the public interest defence.
CONCLUSION
Privacy is an area of law where the “political and cultural commonalities” between 
England and Scotland have clearly had an effect outweighing any tendency there 
might have been towards divergent development arising from their different 
origins.  Both have preferred to approach the question incrementally and through 
the medium of specifically defined and limited wrongs, rather than from some 
broad idea of a general right or principle from which specific results could be 
deduced.  The legal position has been transformed, however, by the HRA 1998, 
and it is Scots law which appears better placed to deal properly with the fallout.  
Nor is this any more merely a matter of making Scots law more Civilian, the 
reproach to which T B Smith’s arguments often fell victim in his lifetime.  But the 
                                                
116 Short Commentary, 655-656. 
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courts will scarcely be able to do the necessary work from just their own 
resources.  The question now is whether Scotland will follow the English lead, 
wherever that may go, or extend their comparative horizons and (adapting Shael 
Herman’s evocative phrase) march there to their own drummers.  
